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Abstract
The last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security actor.
The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identiﬁed by the EU have led
to progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These concerns have
often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, however,
indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically operationalized, leading
to a fragmented security ﬁeld. This article has two main aims: To devise a framework for the
analysis of the EU’s coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the cybersecurity ﬁeld. By
focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the EU can be considered
a coherent actor in this ﬁeld or whether this policy is being implemented according to different
and unco-ordinated rationales.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is an intricate security actor, covering an increasing number of
areas and policies, ranging from the environment to cyberspace. A characteristic trait of
this complexiﬁcation has been the emphasis put by the EU on the merging of internal
and external security and on the need to develop policies, actors and instruments that
are coherent within this security context (Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). As acknowledged
by former European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Jacques Barrot,
‘Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies have increasingly had an impact on
international relations and play a vital role in the European Union’s (EU) external
policies. Conversely, many of Europe’s internal policy goals depend on the effective
use of external policy strategies’ (2009, p. 11). More recently, the EU Global Strategy
also refers to the need for further integration between internal and external security: ‘In
security terms, terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime know no borders. This calls
for tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom,
security and justice’ (European Union, 2016, p. 50). However, as the degree of
complexity in the EU’s security increases, questions should be asked regarding the
coherence underlining the combination of what is now a large plethora of instruments,
actors and policies. The EU may be becoming an increasingly complex security actor,
but is it becoming a more coherent one, as it purports to be?
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This is a particularly relevant question when considering cybersecurity (Wessel, 2015).
Recognizing that information technology has become the backbone of European societies
(European Parliament and Council, 2016), the EU has made cybersecurity one of its main
security priorities. Such prioritization has been reﬂected not only at the level of new
initiatives being proposed, but also in the idea that in order for the EU to be an effective
cybersecurity actor it needs to be fully coherent. Cybersecurity questions a number of
important dichotomies (internal/external, public/private, civilian/military) while,
simultaneously, blurring the geographical distinctions between national, European and
global levels (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). As a security area, it provides an ideal
ground to assess the coherence of the EU’s security actorness. On this basis, the present
article proposes to investigate whether the EU is becoming a more coherent security actor
in cyberspace. Speciﬁcally, the article aims at contributing to two main bodies of
literature – one on coherence and one on cybersecurity. Where the ﬁrst is concerned,
the article offers an innovative case study that points out that numerous coherence
problems observed in other areas of security have spilled over to cybersecurity.
Discussing coherence in this policy context implies focusing on the policies and
institutions that sustain the EU’s cybersecurity approach and contrasting them against
the underlying security understandings within which they are framed. Although
cybersecurity as a uniﬁed domain is still a recent ﬁeld of action for the EU (the EU’s ﬁrst
strategy in this area only dates to 2013), the article argues that it is possible to trace a
search for coherence in this ﬁeld prior to that point. Regarding the contribution to
cybersecurity, the article proposes to add to this literature by offering conceptual tools
to assess the EU’s activities in this ﬁeld from a coherence-base perspective. This mapping
exercise will allow for the progressive assessment of the EU’s developments in this ﬁeld,
by matching its practices against its ofﬁcial rhetoric and policy objectives.
In terms of structure, the article is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst one explores
how the concept of coherence has gradually been integrated into EU security policies
and presents an analytical framework, which focuses on the institutional practices and
shared security understandings along two axes: Vertical relations (between Member
States, European institutions and private actors) and horizontal relations (within Member
States, European institutions and private actors). The second section introduces the EU’s
rhetoric on the importance of cybersecurity and of achieving coherence in this policy area.
The third section applies the analytical framework to cybersecurity and contrasts the EU’s
practices of coherence with its rhetoric. It suggests that signiﬁcant obstacles to a fully
coherent policy approach are still visible both in terms of horizontal and vertical relations.
The article concludes by offering a few normative reﬂections on the EU’s coherence as a
cybersecurity actor.
I. Conceptual Reﬂections on Coherence as a key Organizational Principle of the EU
Coherence has long been a topic of policy and academic discussion, reﬂecting the
positioning of this concept at the heart of the construction of the European project
(Cremona, 2008; Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2016). Since the 1990s, the focus of this
literature has been on the association of coherence with efﬁciency and on how best to
achieve it, namely through the identiﬁcation of areas suffering from capability-
expectations gaps (Hill, 1993). Although the concepts of coherence and consistency have
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been abundantly explored in the academic literature, in particular the legal one (Cremona,
2008; Van Vooren, 2012), this article has chosen not to embark on a deﬁnitional
discussion, but rather adopt the conceptualization used by the EU. The reason for this
choice is determined by the purpose of this article, which is to explore whether the EU
is becoming a more coherent cybersecurity actor, according to its own proposed
coherence objectives. In the European Security literature, this coherence is debated along
the lines of whether the Foreign and Security Policy and the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice can be seen as coherent, including coherence within each individual policy
area (Missiroli, 2001; Trauner, 2011) and across the different security policy areas
(Pawlak, 2009).
For the purposes of this article, and having the European Commission documents as a
guiding reference, we propose to adopt a dual deﬁnition of coherence as institutional co-
ordination and as shared understanding of security (European Commission, 2006). The
institutional co-ordination focuses on two elements – operational and political: the
concrete practices of the actors involved in the co-operative efforts (or absence of) on
the one hand, and the political obstacles and incentives framing those relations, on the
other. For these relations to be solid and fully coherent, they should be based on similar
views about security, threats and potential responses between those same actors, which
corresponds to the second coherence dimension considered in this article.
As the external and internal dimensions of security became more relevant within the
EU framework, so did the perception of their increased blurring (Bigo, 2000; Trauner
and Carrapico, 2012). The emergence of a post-Cold War security environment led to
the replacement of nuclear deterrence with the prospect of new non-state security threats,
such as organized crime and terrorism (Tickner, 1995). In Europe, new transnational
solutions, better adapted to these emerging threats and coherently articulating the EU’s
security actorness, had to be devised. Although there had been references to coherence
since the early 1970s (Juncos, 2013), it is in the post-Cold War context that the concept
of coherence starts to permeate EU discourse in a clearer way.
This shift in security priorities reﬂects a larger trend in the development of the EU legal
order, in which coherence has gradually become one of the main constitutional principles
(Cremona, 2008). The Maastricht Treaty, for example, was explicit about this goal: ‘The
Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies’ (Art. C).
Since then, the importance of developing and strengthening a coherent approach to
European security has continued to expand (European Commission, 2006; European
Council, 1999). As a recent example, the European Agenda on Security stressed that
‘EU internal security and global security are mutually dependent and interlinked. The
EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of actions
combining the internal and external dimensions’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 4).
The Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A European Union Response,
presented in 2016, follows the same line when it promotes ‘a holistic approach that will
enable the EU, in coordination with member States, to speciﬁcally counter threats of a
hybrid nature by creating synergies between all relevant instruments and fostering close
cooperation between all relevant actors’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 3). As
mentioned above, the same logic has now been replicated in the recently launched Global
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (European Union, 2016).
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The concept of ‘coherence’ is, in our view, currently at the heart of the EU’s security
actorness and strategic vision and it has been used to further justify institutional reform. It
is the case, for instance, of the creation of the High Representative for Foreign and
Security Policy, aimed at increasing coherence between EU institutions (Juncos, 2013).
However, and despite having attracted substantial policy and academic attention, this is
a concept that remains rather fuzzy and problematic.
Incoherent Coherence?
For the European Commission, coherence should be equated with ‘better strategic
planning’, ‘better delivery and impact’ and ‘better co-operation’ (2006, pp. 6–9). The
European Security Strategy mentions that coherence is about ‘bringing together different
instruments and capabilities’, ‘better coordination’ and ‘unity of command’ (Council of
the European Union, 2003, p. 13). Despite some degree of speciﬁcation, however, the
concept of coherence remains considerably vague. A good example of this fuzziness is
the EU’s interchangeable use of coherence and consistency, as explored in Missiroli’s
work. In his view, the usage of different terms is signiﬁcant as, legally, consistency is
deﬁned as the ‘absence of contradiction’, whereas coherence implies ‘an added value’
(2001, p. 4). Politically, however, as the author concludes, such distinction is less relevant
as ‘[b]oth terms hint at the need for coordinated policies with the goal of ensuring that the
EU acts unitarily’ (2001, p. 4). The expectation is that by acting in a co-ordinated fashion,
the EU will be a stronger actor. Despite having taken some important steps in that
direction in the last few years, there is still, we argue, an important gap between rhetoric
and practices between the EU’s aspired role as a uniﬁed security actor and the
developments carried out for that purpose (Argomaniz, 2009).
As mentioned in the introduction, assessing the EU’s coherence in this ﬁeld entails
looking at both its institutional co-ordination and the existence (or not) of shared views
on security, threats and potential responses. In Table 1, each of these conceptualizations
is analyzed along a horizontal and a vertical axis (Nuttall, 2005). The horizontal one
includes the elimination of contradictions in terms of policies, agency and instruments,
at EU level, as well as between Member States and private actors, whereas the vertical
axis explores the co-ordination between actors from a multilevel perspective (Biscop
and Andersson, 2008).
Coherence as institutional co-ordination should be understood as the optimal
alignment of procedures, policy outputs, instruments and actors, necessary to tackle
security threats that are not bound by national borders (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012).
According to the academic literature (Trauner, 2011; Wessel, 2015), there is considerable
indication that the proposed increase in coherence has not yielded the expected results in
terms of co-ordination, leading to a capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993). On the one
hand, the EU has made considerable progress in terms of promoting common policy
outputs, implementing new procedures to develop common instruments and encouraging
security actors to work together.1 On the other hand, however, issues of inter-institution
1 The streamlining of internal procedures has been accelerated through the elimination of the pillar system and the
replacement of unanimity voting with qualiﬁed majority voting in Justice and Home Affairs (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). In
addition, integrated security approaches have been promoted through the co-production of joint instruments, such as the
Cyber Security Strategy (European Commission and HREU, 2013).
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and inter-agency conﬂict, overlap and lack of communication are said to be particularly
worrying.2
Coherence as shared understanding of security threats, implies looking at how different
actors both vertically and horizontally deﬁne security as a concept and identify both the
threats and ideal policy responses to best address them. In this area, clear progress in
Member States’ convergence towards a number of security-related concepts (Calderoni,
2010), such as ‘transnational organised crime group’, ‘human trafﬁcking’ or ‘terrorism’
has been reported. Despite these developments, authors such as Trauner (2011), have
pointed out discrepancies in terms of how European values are applied in the context of
2 Referring to Civilian Crisis Management and to the division of labour between the Commission and the Council, Howorth
highlights that the CSDP ‘missions embarked on to date have all revealed serious problems of inter-agency rivalry’ (2007,
p. 132).
Table 1: Coherence in the security ﬁeld
Horizontal Axis Vertical Axis
Institutional
co-ordination/integration
Are Member States’ security
institutions/ bodies co-ordinating
policies and instruments
efﬁciently at national level?
Are EU institutions co-ordinating
initiatives efﬁciently at European
level?
Is there co-ordination between
private companies in the area of
security?
Are Member States and EU
institutions co-ordinating
effectively across security
policies?
Are European institutions gaining
competences in the area of
security?
Is the private sector, as an
emerging actor in European
security, co-ordinating
effectively with Member States
and EU institutions?
Shared understandings
Threats, approaches,
responses
Has there been an approximation
or harmonization of national
understandings of speciﬁc
security threats?
Do Member States prioritize a
European response to security
issues?
Do European institutions share
the same understanding of
security threats?
Are threat responses framed
within a similar conceptual
framework?
Does the private sector project a
shared understanding of security
threats?
Are Member States’
understandings of security threats
similar to those of EU
institutions?
Do EU documents reﬂect
national security understandings?
Do Member States apply at
national level the security threat
deﬁnitions used in EU
documents?
Does the private sector share the
same understandings of security
threats as the State sector?
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the convergence between internal and external security. Although the EU argues that it is
highly committed to the upholding of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, it is
not unusual to observe the EU co-operating with countries that do not share the same
respect for these values.3 If we focus speciﬁcally on the issue of convergence towards
common threat understandings at national level, considerable differences have also been
identiﬁed among national deﬁnitions (Calderoni, 2010).
The ﬁrst section of this article proposed a conceptual mapping to analyze the level of
coherence in EU security. The following section will now provide a detailed insight into
the case study of cybersecurity, not only by exploring the origins and development of
this policy ﬁeld, but especially by focusing on the rhetoric of a policy ﬁeld that is
considered to represent one of the main successes in security coherence. The mapping
of the EU’s rhetorical construction of its cybersecurity policy will then serve as a
comparative basis for the third section and draw conclusions regarding the level of
coherence of the area.
II. EU Cybersecurity as a Coherent Policy Field?
Cybersecurity is a broad term that covers occurrences and risks of different nature, from
cybercrime and cyber-attacks to critical infrastructure and personal data protection
(Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar, 2011). An indirect concern of the EU since the early
1990s (Porcedda, 2011), the origins of this policy can be found in the area of information
and computer security, which later expanded to a comprehensive cybersecurity policy
encompassing not only cybercrime but also critical information infrastructure protection
and more recently cyber defence. According to the White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st
century (European Commission, 1993) and the Report on Europe and the Global
Information Society (Bangemann Group, 1994), information and communication
technologies were seen as essential to the continued development of economies and the
completion of the single market. Both these documents already contained the idea that
information and communication technologies would only beneﬁt the economy if they
were coherently articulated and integrated with older sectors of activity. The EU’s interest
in cybersecurity thus started off as an economic concern, which was related to the
advancement of the Single Market, and whose association to a coherent economic policy
appears from an early stage.
The addition of a security rationale to the already existing economic one occurred
towards the end of the 1990s, driven by the international community’s interest in
computer-related crime (European Commission, 2001). The development of this security
rationale was also reﬂected within the EU’s rhetoric, which was by then particularly
concerned about illegal and harmful content on the Internet, as well as rapidly growing
high-technology crime (Council of the European Union, 1997). From the late 1990s to
the mid-2000s, a ﬂurry of non-legally binding instruments and initiatives emerged in this
area, aimed at fostering Member State awareness and shared concern. Examples of such
instruments include the introduction of the term ‘high tech crime’ in Council conclusions
3 For instance, the EU external border agency, FRONTEX, has co-ordinated operations where the EU intercepted suspected
illegal migrants and handed them over to third countries, including to authoritarian regimes such as Qaddaﬁ’s Libya
(Frontex, 2007).
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for the ﬁrst time in 1999 (European Council, 1999); the eEurope 2002 -- Information
Society for All -- Action Plan, which focused on fostering a more secure Internet in order
to create the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world (Council of the
European Union and European Commission, 2000); and the Commission Communication
on Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-
related Crime (2001). Similarly to the international shift, the idea of coherence also
moved in the direction of increased co-operation at EU level.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned evolution, cybersecurity did not become a top
security priority until the mid-2000s (even the 2003 European Security Strategy was
notably silent on the topic). The change emerged with the growing realization that
information systems and technologies were vulnerable to external attacks, particularly
of a terrorist nature (European Commission, 2004). This shift led to two main
outcomes: 1) the move from non-legally binding to legally binding instruments, as
was the case of the Council Framework Decision on Attacks against Information
Systems (Council of the European Union, 2005); and 2) the further reinforcement of
the idea of coherence as a necessary element of efﬁciency and as a desirable result best
achieved at the EU level. Both outcomes were connected by the perception that
organized crime and terrorism represented a clear threat to the achievement of a safer
information society, which was being put at risk by the existence of gaps and
differences, and indeed gaps, between Member States’ laws. The national level was
presented as being insufﬁciently equipped to adequately answer to these increasingly
transnational threats and a common approach, characterized by approximation and
developed at EU level was, instead, introduced as a necessary response (Council of
the European Union, 2005).
Since then, there has been a clear effort to consolidate the EU’s activities in the ﬁeld,
namely by raising public awareness, by investing in a comprehensive and coherent
strategy and corresponding instruments, such as the recently approved NIS Directive.
As the second part of this section will demonstrate, the EU’s consolidation efforts have
been focused on the three main pillars of this policy’s institutional architecture:
Cybercrime, critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and, to a lesser extent,
cyber defence.
Consolidating a Coherent EU Cybersecurity Policy
There has been a concerted attempt within the EU to promote coherence throughout the
ﬁeld. The publication of the 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy -- An Open, Safe and
Secure Cyberspace (EU-CSS) is particularly representative of the push towards increased
coherence, as it resulted from a combined effort between then Home Commissioner
Cecilia Malmström, High-Representative Catherine Ashton and DG Connect
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, with the input of DG JUST (Fahey, 2014). The EU-CSS
rests on three main action pillars – critical information infrastructure protection,
cybercrime and cyber defence (European Commission and HREU, 2013). The strategy
aimed at improving the co-ordination between these three dimensions, which gradually
came to be included in the area of cybersecurity but were still regarded as fairly separate
(Christou, 2016). Critical information infrastructures correspond to physical and
information technology facilities or services that are essential to society (health services,
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water and energy networks, telecommunications, banking), which, if disrupted, could
seriously affect the wellbeing of citizens (Dunn Cavelty and Kristensen, 2008).
Cybercrime refers to a large set of different criminal activities where computers and
information systems constitute either the primary tool of the attack or their main target
(European Commission, 2007). Finally, cyber defence covers the safeguarding of the
communication and information systems at the basis of national defence mechanisms
(European Commission and HREU, 2013).
As previously mentioned, coherence in the EU’s security approach can be divided into
two broad categories: 1) Institutional co-operation, and 2) Shared understanding of
security. Where the ﬁrst is concerned, considerable rhetorical emphasis is being put on
the development of a common approach to cybersecurity based on the enhancement of
co-operation among actors, instruments and policies (European Commission and HREU,
2013). Institutional co-operation is understood as being particularly important given that
the European governance of cybersecurity is rather decentralized, with relevant bodies to
be found in the public and private sectors. In addition to national cybersecurity authorities
and international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the main actors in cybersecurity
include: DG Migration and Home Affairs (cybercrime), the European Cybercrime Centre
(EC3) (cybercrime), the European External Action Service (cyber defence), the European
Defence Agency (EDA) (cyber defence), DG for Communications Networks, Content
and Technology (network and information security), the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) (network and information security) and Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) (cybercrime).
Co-operation with the private sector is also understood as essential, as companies are
considered to have a better insight into the practices of cybercrime (either as victims or as
producers of anti- cybercrime products), and critical information infrastructures are often
in the hands of the private sector (European Commission and HREU, 2013). In order to
reinforce the need for intra-actor coherence, a Cooperation Group has been proposed
by the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive) that
entered into force in August 2016 (Directive (EU) 2016/1148). Similar trends can be
observed regarding instruments and policies. Considerable emphasis has been put on
harmonizing Member States’ capabilities and infrastructures, and on ensuring a minimum
level of requirements among private sector actors to allow co-operation to take place from
a technical point of view (Directive (EU) 2016/1148). There is also a clear interest in
ensuring that cybersecurity is being mainstreamed into larger policy areas, namely EU
external relations and Common Foreign Security Policy (European Commission and
HREU, 2013). Cybersecurity has recently been framed as a priority area in the EU Global
Strategy (2016).
Coherence as shared understanding of security is directly connected with the perceived
need for a EU-wide approach to cybersecurity: ‘attacks against private or government IT
systems in EU member States have given [cybersecurity] a new dimension, as a potential
new economic, political and military weapon’ (European Council, 2008, p. 5). This need
for a more common approach implies the encouragement of a holistic effort by all
stakeholders, including international partners, the private sector and civil society
(European Commission and HREU, 2013). There is the clear perception that
cyberinsecurity cannot be controlled directly by state institutions and therefore requires
the full collaboration of the different sectors of society. Security is understood in this
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context as collaborative, preventive and resilient. Furthermore, it is also an understanding
of security that is intimately tied to the promotion of EU values and principles: ‘Cyber
security can only be sound and effective if it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms
as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU core
values’ (European Commission and HREU, 2013, p. 4). This issue has been rather salient
with regard to the post-Snowden relations between the EU and the US where divergences
between both – particularly regarding privacy and data protection – have been visible
regarding the fundamental norms that underpin governance in cyberspace (Bendiek,
2014; Christou, 2016).
III. From Rhetoric to Practices
Following this analysis of the EU’s cybersecurity rhetoric, this article will now more
thoroughly assess whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this ﬁeld. The
analysis will proceed by ﬁrst exploring the differences between rhetoric and practices
within the horizontal axis (inter- institutional relations at the different EU, national and
private levels), and then within the vertical axis (relations between Member States and
the EU, and between these actors and the private sector) (Table 2).
Horizontal Relations
Europe, the EU included, has been witnessing a shift towards a greater awareness of
the importance of cybersecurity and the need to mainstream it into all areas.
Interviews conducted with EU and national ofﬁcials in Brussels have conﬁrmed the
growing centrality of cybersecurity in policy discussions. The EU Global Strategy
was unambiguous about it: ‘The EU will be a forward-looking cyber player,
protecting our critical assets and values in the digital world’ (European Union,
2016, p. 42). However, the interviews also revealed that despite these important steps,
much remains to be done to achieve coherence in this area. As a security ﬁeld, and
when compared with other major cybersecurity players, the EU’s actorness in
cyberspace is still rather limited (Christou, 2016) and it faces multiple challenges,
including inter-institutional co-ordination and other factors that limit its operational
capacity, such as ﬁnancial investment and human resources. When making the
distinction between operational institutional co-operation and political co-operation,
the former is presented as less problematic and having progressed quicker whereas
the latter seems to have remained a more sensitive area (Interview, CERT EU,
2016). Let us look at the different levels of the horizontal analysis to better unpack
these differences.
As mentioned above, cybersecurity is now a policy priority for EU institutions (Kroes,
2012, p. 3). Present and future measures in the European security ﬁeld will prioritize
cyberspace, as made clear in the EU-CSS (European Commission and HREU, 2013), in
the December 2013 European Council Conclusions, the European Agenda on Security
(European Commission, 2015), the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a
European Union response (European Commission, 2016) and the Shared Vision,
Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign
and Security Policy (European Union, 2016). In fact, the EU institutional architecture has
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developed considerably since 2004, with the creation of specialized agencies, such as
ENISA and Europol’s EC3, as well as co-ordination mechanisms such as the Horizontal
Working Party on Cyber Issues, speciﬁcally created to offer additional co-ordination
between Member States. The latter has succeeded the Friends of the Presidency Group
on Cyber Issues and is responsible for bringing a large range of cyber related topics to
the attention of COREPER and the Council in order to ensure coherence between areas
as different as criminal justice in cyberspace and cyberdiplomacy (Council of the
European Union, 2016). There is now a much clearer idea of who the key stakeholders
in the ﬁeld are and where the need for greater coherence lies (Interview, German
Permanent Representation, 2016). The NIS Directive (European Parliament and Council,
Table 2: Coherence in the cybersecurity ﬁeld
Horizontal Axis Vertical Axis
Institutional
co-operation
Growing culture of co-ordination
between EU institutions, visible through
increase in number of ofﬁcial documents
referring to the need for closer co-
ordination and through representation of
EU bodies in management boards
(namely EC3, ENISA and CERT EU).
However, increased rhetorical co-
ordination has not produced evidence of
co-ordinated practices.
Coherence is hindered by limited
ﬁnancial resources, low staff numbers
and confusing division of labour.
Lack of evidence of greater co-
ordination among private actors through
efﬁcient self-regulation and the setting
of benchmarks.
There are clear problems of co-
ordination between the EU level and the
national one due to different levels of
preparedness of Member States.
Cybersecurity governance remains the
responsibility of Member States.
Fragmentation of the European approach
through the creation of sub-regional
partnerships.
ENISA and EC3 are gaining new
competences in the area of cybersecurity
and their inﬂuence in shaping national
policies has also increased.
There is evidence of the willingness of
the private sector to collaborate in
cybersecurity governance, but results
have so far been limited.
Shared
understandings
Threats,
approaches,
responses
Growing rhetoric on shared
cybersecurity threats both at the EU and
at national level through the production
of ofﬁcial documents.
However, Member States’ commitment
to a shared understanding of
cybersecurity is not always clear.
Lack of evidence regarding whether the
private sector shares the same
understanding of cyber threats.
Prevention and preparedness practices
show that not all companies share the
same understanding of risk.
Member States have added
responsibilities, given the central role
they assume in Europe’s cybersecurity
architecture, but they, overall share the
same threats and concerns.
They do not, however, share the same
responses, due to different levels of
cybersecurity development and lack of
trust.
Only part of the private sector shares the
EU and national concerns as responses
continue to diverge considerably.
Helena Carrapico and André Barrinha10
© 2017 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2016) appears to further contribute to this by bringing together the European
Commission, Member States and ENISA as members of the new Cooperation Group,
which has been created to offer strategic guidance and facilitate co-operation between
Member States on information security.
Bendiek refers to this progress when she mentions that ‘this cooperation ﬁnds
expression in the joint meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), as well as in the
joint sessions of the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)’ (2012, p. 20). It is also
embodied in the mutual representation of ENISA in the EC3 board and vice-versa. The
two agencies signed a co-operation agreement in 2014 that contributed to a higher level
of co-ordination between them. More recently, they have been developing a common
taxonomy for practitioners to refer to cyber incidents, a common format for relevant
information and a mechanism for information exchange (ENISA, 2015b). EEAS
representatives also sit on the board of EC3. In fact, interviews conducted by the authors
in 2015 and 2016 reveal an emerging ‘cybersecurity community’ across EU institutions
that is based upon a culture of communication, co-ordination and the acknowledgment
of limited resources (Interview, EEAS, 2015; Interview, European Commission, 2016).
The attempt to increase co-ordination has not, however, always resulted in coherent
inter-institutional work. On the contrary, the EU’s approach to cyberspace continues to
be fragmented, (Christou, 2016; Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar, 2011), and possesses
characteristics of an emerging policy ﬁeld with a ‘lack of clearly delineated areas of
responsibility and accountability among the different institutions’ (Bendiek, 2012, p.
12). There are co-ordination problems between, but also within institutions, which are
related to the historical evolution of the different cybersecurity areas, as well as the
perception that each area still experiences different separate challenges. It is not unusual
to ﬁnd projects whose objectives clash with those of other institutions (Interview,
European Parliament, 2016). Furthermore, states, via the Council, seem to be more
reluctant than other institutions (such as the European Parliament) to enhance EU powers
in this area (Interview, CERT EU, 2016).
As a consequence, the allocated resources are often extremely low when compared
with other security areas and other parts of the world. For instance, in 2013 the Pentagon
requested USD 3.2 billion worth of funding be allocated to cybersecurity (Comninos,
2013). Comparatively, the EU’s network and information security agency, ENISA, has
an annual budget of €11 million (ENISA, 2016a), the European Cybercrime Centre,
EC3, had an initial budget of €7 million (BBC News, 2013), and until recently the
European External Action Service (EEAS) had only four people working on
cybersecurity (Renard, 2014b, p. 14).
Regarding the level of coherence at the national level, the problems are similar,
although more acute. Cybersecurity is regarded, on the one hand, as a sensitive area where
the sharing of information does not come naturally to all Member States, and on the other
hand as an emerging area which is new to many countries (an idea consensually shared by
all the stakeholders interviewed in Brussels for this article). Whereas Member States such
as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy would like to go further than the current
EU cybersecurity framework, other countries prefer forms of sub-regional co-operation.
One such example is the Visegrad countries plus Austria, who created the Central
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European Cyber Security Platform (CSCSP) that promotes co-operation between their
respective CERTs and Computer Security and Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs)
(Interview, CERT EU, 2016). The problem of differing priorities does not lie only in
political preferences but also in security capabilities, including the necessary institutional
framework to exchange information with other countries and the capacity to conduct
cybercrime and cyber defence operations. Where the ﬁrst is concerned, there is still no
agreement regarding the most appropriate model for the collection and sharing of
information between Member States (Interview, European Parliament, 2016). There is
also the issue that national authorities have different models of cybersecurity co-
ordination at national level, which further complicates the choice of a model for
information exchange (Christou, 2016; Guitton, 2013). Furthermore, not all countries
are ready to make the ﬁnancial commitment that is involved in creating the necessary
infrastructure and as a result tend to not prioritize cybersecurity (Interview, European
Parliament, 2016). This difference in capabilities and prioritization is particularly visible
in the number of existing national cybersecurity strategies among EU Member States,
which in 2016 was still limited to 23 (ENISA, 2016b). The NIS Directive recognizes
these discrepancies between Member States, suggesting that this ‘results in an unequal
level of protection of consumers and businesses, and undermines the overall level of
security of network and information systems within the Union’ (European Parliament
and Council, 2016, p. 2).
Regarding the level of private actors, we can also identify similar coherence
problems. As mentioned previously, the private sector plays a central role in this security
area: It acts as an agenda setter – as it raises awareness of speciﬁc trends – and as a
partner to EU institutions and Member States (Interview, European Parliament, 2016).
The fulﬁlment of this role also implies a considerable amount of intra-sector co-
operation. In particular, ENISA feels that it is extremely important for different sectors
of the economy to collaborate on the development and adoption of security standards
in order to better protect consumers, the Digital Single Market and the industries
themselves from cyber-attacks (ENISA, 2015a). However, there is indication that the
level of co-ordination among companies and levels of cybersecurity maturity vary
considerably depending on the sector of activity. Whereas the ﬁnancial sector is more
open to co-operation, the telecommunications one is more hesitant (Interview,
Commission, 2016). The hesitation can in part be explained by the fear that information
exchange could result in the eroding of a competitive edge (Interview, European
Parliament, 2016; Giacomello, 2014).
Vertical Relations
When asked about the coherence between the EU, national and private actors levels, most
of the interviewees agreed that we have witnessed an increase in coherence, linked to the
Europeanization of national approaches to cybersecurity. The Europeanization has
become visible in the greater awareness of cybersecurity issues and in gradual
development of cybersecurity standards. This trend is particularly linked to three main
elements: 1) the perception that cybercrime is increasing; 2) the response to the massive
usage of the Internet and digital services; 3) the reaction to international cyber-attacks and
their impact on countries such as Estonia and The Netherlands (Interview, German
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Permanent Representation, 2016). Despite growing Europeanization, cybersecurity in
Europe ‘remains almost exclusively a national prerogative’ (Renard, 2014a, p. 13). This
point is particularly relevant, given the EU’s claim, as seen above, that cybersecurity is
too complex and too transnational in nature to be left to Member States. In 2012, ofﬁcials
from the European Commission publicly criticized the low level of preparedness of a
considerable number of Member States (Nielsen, 2012). The problems of co-ordination
that were described above among Member States are also reﬂected in the co-operation
between Member States and EU institutions. Brussels often has difﬁculty convincing
Member States of the importance of furthering integration in this area, often resorting
to projects ‘á la carte’ where national participation is voluntary as is the case of EDA
projects. The problem, however, does not stem only from the national level. The
Network and Information Directive is a speciﬁc example which could lead to co-
ordination problems and a lack of coherence, particularly regarding the division between
network information infrastructure bodies and law enforcement ones, as EC3 plays a
very limited role in the directive (European Parliament and Council of the European
Union, 2016, p. 9).
In terms of co-operation between private and public actors, similar problems
emerge. Although public private partnerships (PPPs) are widespread in this sector, their
level of co-operation varies considerably and there is often a degree of uncertainty
regarding what the partners can offer each other (Interview conducted in Brussels,
2016). One of the problems, long identiﬁed, but not yet solved, is the existence of
diverging interests where the private sector privileges efﬁciency and proﬁt, and the
public sector prioritizes security (Dunn Cavelty and Sutter, 2009). According to
Bossong and Wagner (2016), this divergence in interests is reﬂected in the large
multitude of ill-deﬁned forms of public–private co-operation in the area of
cybersecurity. These authors show through a comparative study of many PPPs in this
area that these forms of co-operation often remain at the rhetorical level because they
have little to offer to the private side. As an example, an ENISA report from 2015
revealed that the main PPP led by this agency, the European Public Private Partnership
for Resilience (E3PR), failed to produce meaningful results because of multiple
conﬂicts of interests relating to the costs of mandatory security measures and of data
conﬁdentiality (ENISA, 2015c).4 This divergence eventually affects the level of trust
between partners, which is essential for information sharing regarding the disclosure
of cyber-attacks at national level. Finally, PPPs also have the problem of being too
narrow and not taking into account the level of integration of speciﬁc markets (Dunn
Cavelty and Sutter, 2009): a PPP focusing on the protection of electric grids might
not consider the security of third party companies, which the electric grid relies on
to produce energy.
Overall, we could argue that there is a contradiction within the EU’s vertical axis of
cybersecurity: On the one hand, it clearly highlights the limits of national approaches,
both due to the transnational character of the threats and to the heterogeneous approach
to the ﬁeld, and, on the other hand, it promotes, in its strategy, ‘a decentralized
4 In addition to E3PR, other PPP-related initiatives can also be found in the NIS Public–Private Platform, which was
proposed in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy of 2013. More recently, a contractual Public–Private Partnership (cPPP) has also
been signed in this area in July 2016 with the aim of structuring and co-ordinating digital security industries in the EU.
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organization, where cybersecurity governance remains in the Member States, while the
EU supports capacity building, ensures consistency across Member States, and facilitates
co-ordination and outreach’ (Ramunno, 2014, p. 1).
Conclusion
Our understanding of European security in 2016 is certainly less assertive than a decade
ago, when authors such as Allen G. Sens argued that ‘[t]he EU will increasingly become
the institutional centre of gravity for security policy deliberation, coordination and action
by European governments’ (2007, p. 25). However, even if such a favourable view of the
EU’s security actorness is far from being accomplished, one cannot deny that in areas
such as cybersecurity the EU is gradually becoming an important actor (Christou, 2016;
Wessel, 2015). If to this we add the increasingly complexity of issues the EU needs to
deal with (from border management to counter-terrorism), it becomes clear that a coherent
EU might be necessary to tackle the multiple security issues that affect its citizens and
Members States.
The mapping presented above allows for a structured approach to the issue of
coherence in EU security, focusing both on the vertical relations between the EU, its
Member States and private actors, and on the horizontal relations between its multiple
institutions and agencies. Focusing on the speciﬁc case of cybersecurity, it was possible
to conclude in this preliminary study, that the EU has an explicit ambition to be a coherent
security actor. However, both the architecture put in place under the EU-CSS and the
resistance from Member States to allow the EU to have a more stringent control over their
cyber activities, limit the EU’s coherence in the ﬁeld. That said, both the rising political
importance given to cybersecurity and the progressive consolidation of what is still a
rather recent ﬁeld of activity, means there are signs the EU might move towards a more
coherent actorness in the ﬁeld.
We should, however, conclude this article on a cautionary note. When discussing the
coherence of the EU as a security actor, there are a few normative assumptions that are, by
default, associated with it. First, and foremost, the idea that it is better for the EU to act as
a unitary actor, as that will mean a more ‘effective’ EU. This is an assumption that is far
from self-evident, at least in the realm of foreign policy, where the EU ‘has often achieved
unanimity at the expense of effectiveness’ (Missiroli, 2001, p. 5). Furthermore, ‘a policy
can be effective without necessarily being consistent (as the “carrot-and stick” metaphor
and the “good cop-bad cop” example epitomise)’ (Missiroli, 2001, p. 5). Second, there is
also the notion that a more coherent Union is, in the security ﬁeld, a more integrated union
where different policy areas coincide to offer the best possible toolkit of action. In such a
case, security threats are presented in a spectrum where continuity, rather than difference,
occupies central stage, but that ultimately, might encourage ‘an exaggeration of
connections between them’ (Anderson, 2007, p. 43). Finally, the idea that a more
effective EU is ‘a good thing’ due to the values it portrays, as visible in the European
Security Strategy: ‘An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a
global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading
to a fairer, safer and more united world’ (European Union, 2003, p. 14). That might not
always be the case. As alerted by Bendiek, ‘regulative strategies such as the planned
EU strategy on cybersecurity cannot be measured only by their efﬁciency. Instead, they
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also have to fulﬁl the fundamental criteria of democratic governance: transparency, rule of
law, accountability and participation’ (Bendiek, 2012, p. 26). Particularly in the ﬁeld of
cybersecurity, where decision-making ‘is characterised by a lack of transparency and
accountability’ (Bendiek, 2012, p. 24), it is fundamental that we understand that a
coherent actor must also be coherent with the values it defends.
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